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Abstract
This paper develops a decomposition algorithm by which a market economy with many
households may be solved through the computation of equilibria for a sequence of represen-
tative agent economies. The paper examines local and global convergence properties of the
sequential recalibration (SR) algorithm. SR is then demonstrated to efﬁciently solve Auerbach-
Kotlikoff OLG models with a large number of heterogeneous households. We approximate
equilibria in OLG models by solving a sequence of related Ramsey optimal growth problems.
Thisapproachcanprovideimprovementsinbothefﬁciencyandrobustnessascomparedwith
simultaneous solution methods.
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edged.1 Introduction
Over the past twenty years inﬁnite horizon general equilibrium models with overlapping genera-
tions (OLG) have become an important tool for policy analysis, and these have been fruitfully ap-
plied in ﬁelds such as macroeconomics or public ﬁnance (see, e.g., Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987],
and Kotlikoff [2000] for an overview). OLG models naturally involve a large number of variables
and equations that describe the equilibrium behavior of economic agents. As a consequence, the
developmentoflarge-scaleOLGmodelsisoftenlimitedbythecomputationalcapacityofavailable
numerical solution methods. In particular, models that exhibit a rich household side including a
variety of household-speciﬁc effects, a large number of heterogeneous households, and realistic
agent lifetimes typically require “customized solution methods” which may be both costly to im-
plement and difﬁcult to validate.
In this paper we develop a decomposition algorithm based on “off the shelf numerical tools”1
for solving general equilibrium models with many households, of which OLG models are a spe-
cial case. Our approach is primarily appropriate for computing equilibria in models in which the
number of agents is so large that simultaneous solution methods that operate directly on the equi-
librium system of equations are infeasible due to the high dimensionality related to income and
household-speciﬁc effects. The “sequential recalibration” (SR) algorithm presented here is based
on the solution of a sequence of nonlinear complementarity problems2, although in special cases
the same procedure may be implemented by solving a sequence of convex nonlinear program-
ming problems. The main idea of our decomposition approach is to solve a market economy with
many households through the computation for equilibria for a sequence of representative agent
economies. Typically, the sequence of prices and quantities converges to the true equilibrium
allocation.
The close connection between the allocation of a competitive market economy and the opti-
mal solution to a representative agent’s planning problem is well known and widely cited in the
economic literature. The use of an optimization problem to characterize equilibrium allocations
in a general equilibrium framework goes back to Negishi [1960]. Negishi’s original paper was pri-
marily concerned with optimization as a means of proving existence. Dixon [1975] developed
1 GAMS code for our applications are provided in Appendix B of this paper.
2 Rutherford [1995b] and Mathiesen [1985] have shown that a complementary-based approach is convenient, robust,
and efﬁcient. A characteristic of many economic models is that they can be cast as a complementary problem. The
complentarity format embodies weak inequalities and complementary slackness, relevant features for models that
contain bounds on speciﬁc variables, e.g. activity levels which cannot a priori be assumed to operate at positive
intensity. Such features are not easily handled with alternative solution methods.
1the theory and computational effectiveness of “joint maximization algorithms” for multi-country
trade models. Rutherford [1999] presented the “sequential joint maximization algorithm” (SJM)
which provides a simple recursive version of Negishi’s method. There are similarities between the
SR and SJM algorithms. Both approaches solve subproblems representing relaxations of the equi-
librium conditions. The SJM algorithm ignores consumer budget constraints but retains details
of consumer demand systems. The SR algorithm employs a yet looser representation of individ-
ual consumer’s demand systems by omitting both income constraints and global properties of the
individual utility functions. The omission of global characteristics of preferences simpliﬁes the
model but can hinder convergence. The appropriateness of our proposed solution method there-
fore depends on the characteristics of the underlying model.
Ourdecompositionapproachcanbeusefulforthecomputationofequilibriainlarge-scalegen-
eral equilibrium models with many households. There are many economic questions for which
heterogeneous agent models have to be used to provide answers, and an increasing amount of re-
searchemploysframeworksthatallowforintra-cohortheterogeneityinanOLGsetup.3 Webelieve
thatourapproachcanbebeneﬁcialforawiderangeofeconomicapplications,inparticularwithin
theclassofOLGmodels, duetothefollowingreasons. First, bysigniﬁcantlyreducingthecomputa-
tional overhead of the numerical problem at hand our method facilitates the development of OLG
models which feature a complex and rich household side. This strengthens the microfoundation
of the models in general and allows to analyze in detail intra- and intergenerational distributive
consequences of economic policy. Second, our approach enables to solve OLG models that in-
clude a “realistic” number of households within each age group in the sense that the number of
households in the model (more closely) corresponds to the number of observational units avail-
able from household survey data. This avoids relying on some ad-hoc aggregation of household
groups, and thereby helps to enhance the empirical basis of the model. Third, and more generally,
our method can also be effectively applied to OLG models which display a high dimensionality
that stems from sources other than the household side. Potential applications may here include
multi-sectoralandmulti-countrymodels,ormodelswhichincorporateadetailedgovernmentsec-
tor.
3 For instance, Conesa and Krueger [1999], Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser [1999], and Huggett and Ventura [1999]
investigate the intra-cohort distributive and welfare consequences of social security reform. Fehr [2000] looks at
pension reform during the demographic transition in the case of Germany. Ventura [1999] explores the general
equilibrium impact and associated distributional consequences of a revenue neutral tax reform, and Jensen and
Rutherford [2002] analyze the intra- and intergenerational welfare effects of ﬁscal consolidation via debt reduction.
This paper concentrates on applications within the Auerbach-Kotlikoff OLG framework. For a general discussion of
economies with heterogeneous agents, see, e.g., Rios-Rull [1995].
2In addition, our contribution adds to the recent and growing body of research that deals with
the integration of macro and microsimulation models, the “micro-macro” approach to modeling
[Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2006]. This strand of literature aims to combine the streng-ths of both
the computable general equilibrium (CGE) paradigm and microsimulation models. While CGE
models have become standard tools of quantitative policy assessment over the last twenty years,
one major critique is their reliance on the concept of the “representative agent” and their usage of
unclear aggregation procedures. The virtue of the microsimulation approach, on the other hand,
is to replace representative agents with “real households” as observed in standard household sur-
veys. This, however, is typically achieved at the cost of ignoring general equilibrium effects that
are essential for policy analysis. The simplest link between economy-wide modeling and the mi-
crosimulation approach proceeds top down, i.e. simulated policy changes obtained from an ag-
gregate representation of the economy are passed down to a microsimulation module, as, e.g., in
Bourguignon, Robilliard, and Robinson [2005] and Bourguignon and Spadaro [2006]. The prin-
cipal weakness of the top down approach is of course the absence of feedback effects from the
micro to the macro level. Relatively few studies have attempted to fully integrate both approaches,
most of them by means of employing an iterative strategy between the microsimulation and the
CGE model (Cockburn and Cororatona [2007], Savard [2003, 2005], Arntz et al. [2006]). Also be-
longing to this class of models, Rutherford, Tarr, and Shepotylo [2005] applied the SR algorithm
to a large-scale, static general equilibrium model with 25 sectors and 53,000 households to assess
the poverty effects of Russia’s WTO accession. All of these studies, however, are concerned with
applications in a static framework. Clearly, covering complex behavioral responses and potential
general equilibrium and macroeconomic effects in a dynamic setup is essential for many policy
issues.4
The present paper develops a computational technique that allows to fully integrate a com-
prehensive system of OLG households, that exhibits a substantial degree of intra-cohort hetero-
geneity, into a generic Auerbach-Kotlikoff model. We show that the positive experience of the SR
algorithm for large-scale static models carries over to dynamic applications and demonstrate its
effectiveness for solving OLG models with a large number of heterogeneous households. To ﬁnd
the equilibrium transition path of the OLG economy, our algorithm solves a sequence of “related”
Ramsey optimal growth problems where the system of overlapping generations is replaced by an
4 Available models tend to concentrate on some speciﬁc behavior, abstracting from other important components
of the demo-economic life cycle. For instance, Townsend [2002], Townsend and Ueda [2003] concentrate on sav-
ing/investment behavior under uncertainty and in different ﬁnancial market environments.
3inﬁnitely-lived representative agent. We employ an iterative procedure between the macro and
micro model that is based on the successive recalibration of preferences of the artiﬁcial represen-
tative agent.
In order to characterize limitations of the algorithm, we develop local convergence theory for a
simpleexchangeeconomyduetoScarf[1960],andcarryoutnumericalanalysestoexamineglobal
conditions under which the SR algorithm may fail to converge. We show that conditions for local
stabilityofouradjustmentprocessreducetothoseofaWalrasianpricetâtonnementprocess, thus
SR belongs to a large class of algorithms commonly used in computational economics which are
robust, efﬁcient and yet fail to provide global convergence. Our counterexample illustrates that
the SR algorithm may be ill-suited for applications in which there are signiﬁcant income effects.
After having characterized limitations of the technique, we proceed to explore the algorithm’s
performance applied to large-scale OLG models. We consider a prototype Auerbach-Kotlikoff
model which includes up to 2000 heterogeneous households within each generation which dif-
fer with respect to labor productivity over the life cycle and other behavioral parameters. We
compare the performance of the SR algorithm with simultaneous solution methods as suggested
by Rasmussen and Rutherford [2004]. We ﬁnd that SR can provide improvements in both efﬁ-
ciency and robustness. We demonstrate that the decomposition algorithm can routinely solve
high-dimensional OLG models which are infeasible for conventional solution methods.
Lastly, we want to emphasize that our decomposition method is inadequate for approximating
equilibria in OLG economies that are generically Pareto-inferior, i.e. models in which the econ-
omy’s growth rate exceeds the real interest rate (see, e.g., Diamond [1965] and Phelps [1961]). For
the given model, this corresponds to a situation where population growth dominates discounting.
Insuchcircumstancesthereisnosocialplanner’sproblemwhich“linesup”withtheOLGdemand
system. Whether this signiﬁcantly limits the relevance and scope of our approach is an empirical
question. Empirical evidence suggests that the incapacity of our method to deal with dynamically
inefﬁcient equilibria is of minor practical signiﬁcance.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the SR algorithm for the
case of a static economy and illustrates its basic logic by means of graphical analysis. Section 3
investigates a model where convergence of the SR algorithm fails if income effects are relatively
5 Abel, Mankiw, Summers, and Zeckhauser [1989] ﬁnd that for the US economy the condition for dynamic efﬁciency
seems to be satisﬁed in practice. Similarly, under the weak assumption that rates of return are ergodic, Barbie,
Hagedorn, and Kaul [2004] reach the conclusion that the US economy does not overaccumulate capital. By means
of numerical analysis, Larch [1993] suggests that in the Auerbach-Kotlikoff framework rather implausible values
of the pure rate of time preference, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution or the population growth rate are
required to obtain non Pareto-optimal market solutions.
4strong. Section 4 demonstrates that our algorithm can be effectively applied to solve Auerbach-
Kotlikoff OLG models. A central issue here is to demonstrate how the behavior of the overlapping
generations households with ﬁnite lifetimes can be portrayed using a single inﬁnitely-lived repre-
sentative agent. Furthermore, we compare the performance of our algorithm with computational
experience from conventional simultaneous solution methods. Section 5 concludes.
2 CGE with many households: a decomposition approach
This section presents our decomposition method by which a market economy with many hetero-
geneous households may be solved through the computation for equilibria for a sequence of rep-
resentative agent economies. While the primary interest is in dynamic models, it is advantageous
to introduce the algorithm for the case of a two-sector static economy in which we can provide a
graphical description that serves to illustrate its basic logic.
2.1 A static economy
Consider the following static economy which is populated by a large number of heterogeneous
households h = 1,...,H each of whom is endowed with K h and Lh units of capital and labor, re-
spectively. Households earn income Mh = rK h +wLh from supplying their factor endowments




























where the utility function is written in calibrated share form.6 h
i and c
h
i denote the benchmark
value share and the benchmark consumption of good i for household h. Households are hetero-
geneous with respect to h
i , h, K h, and Lh.
Furthermore, there is a single representative ﬁrm which uses capital and labor services to pro-
duce two consumption goods Xi, i,j = 1,2, according to a constant returns to scale production
function Xi = fi(K,L). All goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
6 The appendix brieﬂy reviews some fundamental aspects of calibration which underly most CGE models and which
play an important role in our algorithm.
52.2 A decomposition algorithm
The main challenge for computing equilibria in a setup where H is very large is dimensionality.
Typically, conventional simultaneous solution methods that operate directly on the equilibrium
system of equations are infeasible. Our proposed algorithm decomposes the corresponding nu-
merical problem into two parts and thereby effectively manages to reduce its dimensionality. We
approximate the general equilibrium of the underlying economic model by computing equilibria
forasequenceofrepresentativeagenteconomies. Ineachiteration,weﬁrstsolveageneralequilib-
riumrepresentationoftheunderlyingeconomicmodelinwhichthehouseholdsideisreplacedby
a single representative agent (RA). The second subproblem then consists of solving a partial equi-
librium relaxation of the original model that retains the full structure of the household demand
system. Given equilibrium prices from the previous solution of the RA economy, we compute op-
timal choices for each of the “real” households. In a next step, and to create a basis for successive
iterations, the preferences of the “artiﬁcial” RA are recalibrated such that given candidate equilib-
rium prices the RA choices replicate aggregate household choices.
The key departure from the routine use of calibration in our algorithm is the idea that the cal-
ibration of preferences occurs more than once. The ﬁrst iteration of the algorithm is based on
observable benchmark data, but in subsequent iterations the preferences of the RA are sequen-
tially recalibrated to values determined in the iterative process. For the case of the static economy
as described above, the SR algorithm involves the following steps:
Step 0: Initialize the representative agent economy
In the computation of equilibria we will portray the choices of H households using a single rep-




































where k is an iteration index. Factor endowments of the RA equal the sum of respective factor
endowments across all households. To initialize the RA economy at a consistent data point, we
have constructed the data set such that the RA model and the household model share the same






























i denote initial consumption by the RA and the aggregate value share for good i in
iteration k =0, respectively.
This initial consumption point of the RA in the benchmark equilibrium is represented by point
A in Figure 1 where initial goods prices are denoted by P0. Benchmark prices and an arbitrary elas-
ticityareusedtoextrapolatepreferencesintheneighborhoodofthebenchmarkpointtotheglobal
preferences of the RA, as indicated by the indifference curve which is tangent to the benchmark
budget constraint at point A. The key limitation of the RA model on the demand side is that the
“community indifference curve” represented by this indifference curve does not truthfully portray
the response of household demand to a comprehensive change in both goods and factor prices.
Step 1: Solve for a general equilibrium of the RA economy
We illustrate the solution to the RA model in the ﬁrst iteration of our algorithm in Figure 1. As
depicted here, the assumed exogenous policy shock has led to an increase in factor earnings, and
a reduction in the relative price of X1 as compared with X2. This new price situation is denoted
by P1. The RA model, based on the assumed community indifference curve and the associated








FIGURE 2: EVALUATING HOUSEHOLD DEMANDS AT NEW PRICES (STEP 2)
Step 2: Evaluate household demand functions
In our solution program we read equilibrium prices from the RA model and evaluate the house-
hold demand vector. This produces a different point on the same budget constraint (see Figure
2). The household demand model is based on compensated demand functions so the aggregate
budget constraint for the household demand system is equivalent to the budget constraint which
applies to the RA. Point C corresponds to the aggregate demand which results from solving the
individual household optimization problems. The extent to which C differs from B depends on
both the difference in implicit substitution elasticities and differences in income effects.
Step 3: Recalibrate preferences of the representative agent
ThenextstepinthealgorithmconsistsofspecifyingadifferentsetofpreferencesfortheRAmodel.
Thealgorithmistermed“sequentialrecalibration”onthebasisofthisidea. Afterhavingsolvedone
RA model we construct a new RA model based on a set of preferences which are locally calibrated
totheaggregateconsumptionquantitiesatpointCandtheassociatedrelativeprices. Thisensures
thatgivenpricesP1 theoptimalconsumptionpointofthenewRA,pointCinFigure3,isconsistent
with the aggregated choices by households. Preferences of the RA in iteration k, Uk(C) in (2), are










i (pk 1)isthedemandforgoodi byhouseholdh evaluatedatthecandidatepricevector
from the previous iteration k  1, and where factor income of household h in iteration k, Mk
h(pk),


















i istheaggregatevalueshareofgoodi atiterationk 1. Theindifferencecurvestangentat
A and B are based on identical preferences, but the indifference curve tangent at point C is based
on a new set of community indifference curves, hence it may intersect the indifference curves
based on RA utility in the previous iteration of the algorithm. Note that the preferences of the
“real” households remain unchanged throughout the entire iteration process..
Iterative adjustment
When the RA model is recalibrated at point C, both the representative agent and all households
are in equilibrium at C with prices P1, but at these prices ﬁrms will only supply quantities given
by point B. Hence, due to inconsistency with the supply side of the model there is a general dis-
equilibrium. To illustrate this idea, it is convenient to portray the supply side of the economy by
a production possibility frontier (PPF). Assume that the policy shock produces an expansion in
the PPF (to PPF0) and a substantial change in relative prices from point A to B. The next step in
the solution program is to resolve for a general equilibrium of the new RA model with recalibrated
preferences at point C. Point C in Figure 4 becomes therefore interpreted as point A in the next it-
eration. The solution of this RA model is then characterized by a new optimal consumption point,
here depicted by point D, and prices P2.
Subsequent iterations involve carrying out Steps 1 to Steps 3 (Step 0 initializes the solution
procedure). We stop if some convergence metric, e.g., the 1-norm of the difference between the
price vectors from one iteration to the next, is satisﬁed. Note that subsequent iterations of the
algorithm only involve reﬁnements of the demand system and result in much smaller changes in
relative prices, as indicated here by the change from C to D as compared with A to B.
3 Convergence theory
This section evaluates the performance of our algorithm for an economy in which the exact equi-



















FIGURE 4: ITERATIVE ADJUSTMENT
allocation. We develop local convergence theory for the proposed algorithm and also examine
conditions under which the adjustment process may fail to converge.
TheexampleisduetoScarf[1960]whoconsidersapureexchangeeconomywithanequalnum-
berofn consumersandgoods. Consumerh isendowedwithoneunitofgoodh anddemandsonly
goods h and h+1. Let di,h denote demand for good i by consumer h. Preferences are represented
















As explained in Section 2.2, the sequential recalibration algorithm iteratively adjusts the baseline
level parameter Ci (and i(Ci)) in the utility function of the representative agent. These may be
normalized so that
P
i Ci = n. Market clearing commodity prices for the RA economy are deter-
mined given the baseline level parameters. Let pi(C) denote the price of good i consistent with




denote the market excess demand func-
tion for good i that is obtained from evaluating household demand functions. Given the special




















Of course, in equilibrium it must be true that i(C

)=0, 8i. Let the initial estimateC
0
be selected




i = n. Walras’ law ensures that the adjustment process
d Ci
























































> 0, the process is locally unstable. When an equilibrium is unique and the
process is uninterrupted, then local stability implies global instability.




1 2 [Scarf, 1960]. In the following, we show that the same condition implies instability
for the C-adjustment process of the SR algorithm. Furthermore, it is shown (numerically) that
7 See Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 [Scarf, 1960, p.164]. The parameters of this utility function correspond to Scarf’s param-
eters a and b [Scarf, 1960, p.168] as:  =
1
1+a and  =
b
1+b .
11while the tâtonnement and SR price adjustment processes are locally identical, they may be quite
different at points in the price space far from the equilibrium.


















































































denotes the vector of market excess demand functions from the representative















i0 Ci0 and where e  denotes the elasticity of substitution for the representative agent. In
order to evaluate rp e  at C
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e rC e . (18)






































































































From (14) it therefore follows that the adjustment process in C is locally unstable if:
(2 2)2 +(3 2)  1>0 (23)
which is equivalent to the condition for instability of a simple price tâtonnement adjustment pro-
cess as demonstrated by Scarf [1960, p.169].
3.2 Global convergence
Although the local behavior of the price tâtonnement and the SR algorithm adjustment processes
are identical, they produce different search directions away from a neighborhood of the equilib-
rium. This is apparent in Figure 5 where the two vector ﬁelds are superimposed. Only local to
the equilibrium where price effects dominate income effects, do the two ﬁelds coincide exactly,
as indicated by (23). As one moves further away from the center of the simplex, the vector ﬁelds
become more divergent. We ﬁnd that there are cases in which the SR algorithm does not converge
even though the price tâtonnement is globally stable. This convergence failure is a manifesta-
tion of the simplifying nature of the adjustment process. By solving a sequence of representative
agent economies the SR algorithm omits both income constraints and global properties of the in-
dividual utility functions. While the omission of global characteristics of preferences reduces the




FIGURE 5: COMPARISON OF SR AND TÂTONNEMENT FIELDS
To assess the global convergence properties of the SR algorithm, we perform a grid search
over the behavioral parameters  and . We let the algorithm start from a disequilibrium point
p = (0.2,0.2,0.6) where local equilibrium dynamics are absent. Figure 6 reveals that convergence
oftheSRalgorithmfailsforcombinationsofsmallvaluesforandhighvaluesfor.8 Forthesepa-
rameter conﬁgurations, income effects are relatively strong vis-à-vis substitution effects. In cases
where convergence is achieved, the presence of signiﬁcant income effects means that more itera-
tions are required to ﬁnd the true equilibrium. If, however, income effects are relatively weak, the
SR algorithm only requires a modest number of iterations. The appropriateness of our solution
method therefore depends on the characteristics of the underlying model.
One last remark is in order. To guarantee convergence of the SR algorithm, it is necessary to
8 For both parameters, we choose a grid resolution of 0.05, set e  = 1, and allow for a maximum of 1000 iterations.
The adjustment process is said to converge if the 1-norm of differences between a computed price vector and the
equilibrium point drops below some metric , i.e. kpi   p
i k1 < , where p
i denotes the analytical equilibrium
solution. We set  =0.01.
















FIGURE 6: GLOBAL CONVERGENCE BEHAVIOR FOR DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS OF  AND 
select a sufﬁciently large value for e , the elasticity of substitution of the representative agent. If
e  is too low, convergence may fail even if income effects are relatively weak. Non-convergent
behavior, however, that occurs in the bottom right corner of Figure 6 is robust with respect to e .
The choice of e  is entirely innocuous since this parameter bears no economic signiﬁcance for
the behavior of “real” households in the underlying economic model. Computational experience
suggests to use values of order e  1.
4 OLG models with many households
This section presents a decomposition algorithm for solving overlapping generations models with
many heterogeneous households. The proposed algorithm is an application of the SR approach
with a few elaborations speciﬁc to the OLG context. As in the static setting, an equilibrium alloca-
tion is approximated by computing equilibria for a sequence of representative agent economies.
In the case of OLG, the representative agent economies are Ramsey optimal growth problems
where the system of overlapping generations is replaced by a single inﬁnitely-lived agent.
The algorithm is demonstrated for a simple prototype Auerbach-Kotlikoff OLG economy with
productionactivities,intra-cohortheterogeneity,alabor-leisurechoice,andagovernmentsector.9
We solve for the effects of a tax reform that is introduced unexpectedly in year zero, and then
9 The example is an adapted version of the production model presented in Rasmussen and Rutherford [2004]. We
consider a closed economy version of their model and allow for heterogeneity within one generation. While we
investigate a single-sector here, the logic can be readily extended to a multisectoral framework.
15evaluate the performance of our algorithm against numerical solutions that are available from
simultaneous solution methods.
4.1 A prototype Auerbach-Kotlikoff OLG model
4.1.1 Households
Time is discrete and extends from t = 0,...,1. There is no aggregate or household-speciﬁc uncer-
tainty. The economy is populated by overlapping generations of heterogeneous agents. A house-
hold of generation g and type h = 1,...,H is born at the beginning of year t = g, lives for N +1
years, and is endowed with !g,h,t = !(1+
)g units of time in each period g  t  g +N, and
g,h,t is an index of labor productivity over the life cycle.10 
 denotes the exogenous steady-state
growth rate of the economy. Leisure time, `g,h,t, enters in a CES function with consumption, cg,h,t,

























pc,t cg,h,t +py,t i g,h,t  pl,t g,h,t (!g,h,t  `g,h,t)+pr,t kg,h,t +py,t g,h,t
kg,h,t+1  (1 )kg,h,t +i g,h,t
`g,h,t  !g,h,t
cg,h,t,`g,h,t  0
kg,h,g  k g,h,g , i g,h,t+N +(1 )kg,h,t+N 0 (24)
where  is the utility discount factor, h is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for house-
hold h,  = 1=(1 ) is the uniform elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure,
 is a share parameter, and px,t, x = fy,c,l ,rg, denotes the price for the single output good, the
(after-tax) price for consumption, the wage rate, and the capital rental rate, respectively. Hetero-
geneity relates to intra-cohort differences in labor productivity and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Households have access to a storage technology: they can use one unit of the out-
put good to obtain one unit of the capital good next period. We denote the investment into this
10 ! is a constant income scaling factor which is determined in the initial calibration procedure to reconcile house-
hold behavior with the aggregate benchmark data. For more details see Rasmussen and Rutherford [2004].
16technology by i g,h,t. We do not restrict i g,h,t, because we want to permit households to borrow
against future labor income. Private capital kg,h,t depreciates at an annual rate of . k g,h,g de-
notes the capital holdings of generation g at the beginning of life t = g. Initial old generations, i.e.
generations born prior to period zero, are endowed with a non-zero amount of assets: k g,h,0 6= 0,
8g =  N,..., 1,8h. The initial asset distribution for these generations is selected such that the
economy is on a balanced growth path. We assume that newborn households enter with zero as-
sets: k g,h,g = 0, 8g  0,8h. We furthermore rule out that households die in debt. In each period
of thelife cycle householdsreceiveg,h,t units ofthe output goodas a lump-sumtransfer from the
government. For simplicity, we assume that these transfers are allocated to each generation and
type according to its share in the total population. We moreover assume that the government has
no outstanding debt in the initial steady state and hence households’ total assets in period zero




h=1k g,h,t =(1+r)K0, where r is the steady
state interest rate and K0 is the initial aggregate capital stock.11
4.1.2 Firms
There is a single representative ﬁrm which in each period t uses capital and labor services to
produce a single output good Yt according to a linearly homogeneous production function Yt =
F(Kt,Lt). All goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
4.1.3 Government
The government agent collects revenue from levying taxes on consumption, and on capital and la-





h=1g,h,t). We assume that the consumption tax rate (c
t ) adjusts such that
the government budget is balanced on a period-by-period basis:
r
t pr,t Rt +l
t pl,t Lt +c
t py,t Ct =py,t Gt +py,t Tt (25)
where r
t and l
r are the net tax rates on capital and labor income, respectively.
4.1.4 Aggregate economy restrictions
Given inter- and intragenerational heterogeneity, the following feasibility conditions must be sat-
isﬁed:
11 We therefore implicitly assume that the government has no outstanding debt at period zero. A situation with non-
zeroinitialgovernmentdebtslightlycomplicatesthecalibrationprocedurebutisconceptuallystraightforward(see

























The law of motion for the aggregate capital stock is given by:
Kt+1 =(1 )Kt +It . (30)
Finally, the single output good may be used for household consumption, investment, or govern-
ment consumption implying the following condition for balance between aggregate supply and
demand:
F(Kt,Lt)=Ct +It +Gt . (31)
4.2 A decomposition algorithm for OLG models
We approximate the unknown equilibrium allocation of the OLG economy described by (24)-(31)
by computing equilibria for a sequence of “related” Ramsey (optimal) growth problems. Figure
7 provides a schematic exposition of the steps involved in the decomposition procedure. Each
iteration comprises the following three steps. In the ﬁrst step, we solve for the general equilib-
rium of the “related” Ramsey growth problem (Section 4.2.1) which retains the full structure of
the production side of the model but replaces the system of OLG households by a representative
inﬁnitely-livedconsumeragent. Thesecondstepcomputesoptimalhouseholdbehaviorgiventhe
equilibrium prices from the Ramsey economy (Section 4.2.3). This step can be viewed as solving
a partial equilibrium relaxation of the underlying economy that ignores general equilibrium inter-
actions with the production side of the model but retains the full structure of the OLG demand
system. In the third step, we construct a new Ramsey optimal growth problem by recalibrating
the preferences of the “artiﬁcial” Ramsey agent based on households’ choices from Step 2 (Sec-
tion 4.2.4). Subsequent iterations proceed with analogous steps. Typically, the sequence of prices
and quantities computed by our algorithm converges to the true equilibrium allocation. In what
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FIGURE 7: SOLVING OLG BY RAMSEY: STEPS IN THE DECOMPOSITION ALGORITHM
4.2.1 The “related” Ramsey growth problem
As the “related” Ramsey optimal growth problem, we deﬁne a model of the underlying OLG econ-
omy in which the system of overlapping generations is replaced by a single inﬁnitely-lived repre-
sentative agent, hereafter called the Ramsey agent. Apart from this modiﬁcation, the entire eco-
nomic structure of the OLG model including the behavior of other agents, market structure, the

































































Ct +It +Gt = F(Kt,
k
t  Lt)






KT+1 = ^ KT+1 (32)
19where Ct, Lt, Zt, Kt, It, and 
k
t now denote consumption, leisure time, full consumption, the
capital stock, investment, and the time endowment by the Ramsey agent, respectively, and where
b  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. k denotes an iteration index.12
The initial capital stock in the Ramsey economy is given by the aggregate capital stock of the







To approximate the inﬁnite-horizon Ramsey economy by a ﬁnite-dimensional complementar-
ityproblem, weusethestate-variabletargetting methodsuggestedbyLau, Pahlke, andRutherford
[2002] in which the target post-terminal capital stock ( ^ KT+1) is chosen at a level such that invest-






In order to initialize the “related” Ramsey growth problem, it is ﬁrst necessary to characterize a
baseline reference path of the OLG economy. For simplicity, we assume that the economy is ini-
tiallyonabalancedgrowthpathandemployasteady-statecalibrationprocedureproposedbyRas-
mussen and Rutherford [2004] which proceeds in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the optimal proﬁle
of decision variables for a reference generation of type h is computed subject to given aggregate
benchmark data in year zero. The second step involves extrapolating the results from the house-
hold calibration model, together with remaining elements in the aggregate dataset, to set up a
baseline reference path.
Given this reference path, we choose an initial set of preferences for the representative agent
such that the Ramsey growth problem endogenously reproduces the baseline reference path of
the underlying OLG economy. This is accomplished by selecting appropriate reference levels and
value share parameters forU(Zt) in (32):
12 Note that the nested lifetime utility functionU(Zt) is written in calibrated share form. We monotonically transform
preferencesin(24)toobtainalinearhomogenousCESrepresentation. Thisdoesnotaltertheunderlyingpreference













































where pt, t = 0,...,T and x g,h,t, x = fc,`g, denote benchmark prices and household quantity
choices, respectively. The superscript “0” indicates starting values.
The Ramsey agent is endowed with units of “productive” time, 
t, that reﬂect households’ la-








g,h,t (!g,h,t  `g,h,t)+`g,h,t (40)
where `g,h,t is benchmark leisure time by households.
The algorithm is started off by solving the initial Ramsey growth problem as deﬁned by (25),
and (32)-(40). If no policy change is implemented, the given speciﬁcation of the Ramsey economy
ensures that it can reproduce the initial steady state path of the underlying OLG economy as an
equilibrium solution.
4.2.3 The partial equilibrium relaxation
The second step of the algorithm solves a partial equilibrium relaxation of the underlying OLG
economy which retains full details of the household demand system but ignores general equilib-
rium effects. Hence, any interactions via commodity and factor markets and with the production
side of the economy are suppressed. Given equilibrium prices from the previous solution of the
“related” Ramsey growth problem, we evaluate demand functions for each generation and type
that originate from the set of household problems in (24).
In order to obtain a good approximation of the underlying OLG economy, it is necessary to
compute optimalhousehold demandfor allhouseholds and typesin eachperiod ofthe numerical
model that runs from t = 0,...,T. This information then forms the basis for the recalibration of
preferences of the Ramsey agent in the subsequent step of the algorithm. A complication arises
21for periods T  N +1  t  T in which generations are born that live beyond T (hereafter called
terminal generations). To compute the optimal decision proﬁles of these agents, it is essential to
account for their behavior over the full life cycle. With the last cohort of households being born
in period T, this means that there are N post-terminal periods that have to be included in the
analysis, which we denote by ^ t = T,...,T +N. We resolve this issue by employing a steady-state
closure rule which postulates that the economy has reached a steady state by period T  N +1.
This assumption imposes no additional restriction on the model if T is chosen sufﬁciently large.13








^ t = fpt k
g,h,^ t,pt k
y,^ t,pt k
l ,^ tg denote the post-terminal price for full consumption, the output
good, and the market wage all obtained in iteration k, respectively. Correspondingly, xk
T refer to









where eg,h,t() denotes the unit expenditure function for z g,h,t. For future reference, let p g,h,t
denote respective benchmark prices. In (41), r1 = pc
T 1=pc
T   1 deﬁnes the endogenous (steady-
state) interest rate in the terminal period.
Finally, the lifetime income of generation g and type h, evaluated at candidate prices from








r,0k g,h,g . (43)
A similar formula applies to the lifetime income of terminal generations where for post-terminal
periods projected prices according to (41) are used. For future reference, let M g,h denote the life-
time income at benchmark prices.
We are now in a position to compute the demand for of households in the model. In order to
reduce computational complexity, we solve the dual problem making use of formulas (A-7)-(A-9)
(seetheAppendix). Let eg,h(pk
g,h)denotetheexpenditurefunction foraunitofug,h which—given
the speciﬁc structure of preferences14— can be constructed using the vector of prices for the full
13 The speciﬁc choice of T depends on the nature of the policy shock that is considered. In our numerical examples
below we set T =150.
14 Note that in the given case of homothetic preferences, the unit expenditure function conveys all information con-
cerning the underlying preferences.
22consumption good, pk








for 8g , 8h. (44)
Applying Roy’s identity, optimal household demand (in the context of the partial equilibrium re-
laxation) for full consumption, goods consumption and leisure, respectively, evaluated at the can-
didate price vector pk
g,h, are updated in each iteration according to:
z g,h,t(pk
g,h , Mk































l,t g,h,t p g,h,t
!
. (47)
4.2.4 Recalibration of the Ramsey agent’s preferences
The last step in each iteration is to construct a new Ramsey optimal growth problem by recalibrat-
ing the Ramsey agent’s preferences based on optimal household choices from the previous step.































































With varying prices, households adjust their labor supply, and hence the composition of the
laborforcewithrespecttoageandhouseholdtypeisaltered. Butsincelaborproductivitydepends
on these two socio-economic characteristics, aggregate labor productivity in the underlying OLG














Thus, the newly constructed Ramsey optimal growth problem in iteration k +1 consists of solving
(32)(subjectto(33)and(34))withupdatedpreferenceparametersandtimeendowmentasdeﬁned
by (48)–(53). This completes the description of the algorithm.
4.3 Algorithmic performance
The OLG economy presented above has no analytical solution. In order to evaluate our algo-
rithm, we therefore compare its performance to those of conventional simultaneous/direct so-
lution methods. As a benchmark, we take a complementarity-based approach as suggested by
Rasmussen and Rutherford [2004].
The base case parametrization of the economy is as follows. Households live for 51 years or
N = 50. We set ¯ r = 0.05, 
 = 0.01,  = 0.07, h = 0.8,  = 0.32, and  = 0.8. In our numerical
analysis, we test the performance of our algorithm for a different number of household types H
and also allow for various degrees of intra-cohort heterogeneity. For simplicity, we assume that
h, h = 1,...,H, are generated by random draws from a uniform distribution deﬁned over [,].
Likewise, differences in labor productivity are modeled by randomly drawing a g,h from a uniform
distribution with support a  a g,h  a, where the parameter a g,h enters the labor productivity











is assumed that each type has equal size in the total population. The values for the aggregate data
including tax payments in the initial benchmark are based on Input-Output tables for the U.S.
economy in 1996 and are presented at the top of the corresponding computer programs. We solve
the model for T =150 years.
4.3.1 Solving for a policy shock: a fundamental tax reform
We now present an illustrative application of our decomposition algorithm by solving for the ef-
fects of a policy change that in year zero unexpectedly and permanently reduces the capital in-
come tax and introduces a consumption tax to endogenously balance the government budget.
The capital income tax is reduced from a benchmark value of 28.4% to 22.9%.
We start out by considering a case where H = 1, h = 1.2, and a g,h = 0.04. Figure 8 shows the

















































OLG = Iteration 34
...
FIGURE 8: SOLVING OLG BY RAMSEY: SEQUENCE OF INVESTMENT TIME PATHS
The true transition path to a new steady state of the OLG economy as computed by our bench-
mark simultaneous solution method is labeled “OLG”. "Iteration 1" plots the impact of the tax
reform scenario after the ﬁrst iteration of our solution method. This is equivalent to what would
be obtained from solving a Ramsey optimal growth model. Each subsequent iteration of the al-
gorithm produces a new time path for investment that eventually converges to the true solution.
We terminate the search process if kpk
c,t  p
c,tk1 < 10 6. For the current model, this is achieved
after 34 iterations. Figure 9 shows a similar picture for the welfare change experienced by each
generation.15 Note that in terms of welfare changes, stopping after iteration 1 corresponds to a sit-
uation which would emerge from a pure top down approach that fails to take into account general
equilibrium feedback effects from the micro to the macro level.
To assess the quality of the approximation, we use the following two measures. First, the ap-
proximation error ek reports the 1-norm of differences between computed consumption prices
and true equilibrium prices as calculated by our benchmark method: ek = kpk
c,t  p
c,tk1. As ek
constitutes a summary statistic which is deﬁned over the entire model horizon, it says little about
whether price deviations of the computed from the true price path lie within a tolerable band-
15 Kehoe and Levine [1985] have shown that the OLG framework may permit multiple equilibria for certain parameter
values. In such cases, indeterminacy would manifest itself as sensitivity to the truncation date. None of the mod-
els presented here are sensitive to T, provided that it is sufﬁciently large. This and the general robustness of the
models provide evidence that the equilibria are unique. Kotlikoff [2000] reaches the same conclusion regarding the





























































OLG = Iteration 34
FIGURE 9: SOLVING OLG BY RAMSEY: SEQUENCE OF WELFARE CHANGES BY GENERATION




Figure 10 plots ek as a function of the number of iterations. The approximation error quickly
decreases and then converges to zero. After the ﬁrst few iterations our decomposition technique
only involves reﬁnements of the demand system, and consequently, subsequent changes in rela-
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FIGURE 10: SOLVING OLG BY RAMSEY: APPROXIMATION ERROR e k
26TABLE 1: CONVERGENCE PERFORMANCE AND APPROXIMATION ERROR
H Number of iterations Approx. error e k Max. distance k CPU computing
( = 1) (last iteration) (last iteration) time
1 37 10 6 10 7 0 min 13 s (3.78)
10 36 0.002 10 4 0 min 21 s (1.17)
50 35 0.005 10 4 1 min 10 s (0.18)
100 35 — — 2 min 06 s ()
500 34 — — 6 min 14 s ()
1000 34 — — 10 min 48 s ()
2000 29 — — 30 min 31 s ()
Note: Figures in parentheses denote running time of the decomposition algorithm expressed as a fraction of the
running time as required by our benchmark simultaneous solution method. A “” indicates infeasibility of the
simultaneous solution method.
4.3.2 Robustness and accuracy
In order to explore the capacity of our algorithm to solve large-scale OLG models, we examine
its performance for a different number of household types and various degrees of intra-cohort
heterogeneity. Welookagainattheeffectsofthetaxreformscenarioasdescribedabove. Givenour
simple speciﬁcation for the source of intra-cohort differences, we vary the extent of heterogeneity,
denoted by  , by changing the support for the distributions from which h and a g,h are drawn.16
Table 1 reports results from a series of runs where the number of households within each gen-
eration is increased while holding ﬁxed the degree of intra-cohort heterogeneity. The quality of
approximation is excellent (k is around 10 4). As the number of household types increases, our
proposed decomposition procedure become advantageous.17 Most importantly, it is shown that
ouralgorithmcanprovideimprovementsinrobustness ascomparedtothebenchmarksimultane-
ous solution method which quickly becomes infeasible for models in which H 100.
To examine the performance of our algorithm in the presence of a substantial degree of het-
erogeneity among households, we report results for different conﬁgurations of  . We set H =
50 so that the benchmark solution method is feasible and the calculation of approximation er-
rors is available. Not surprisingly, the approximation quality of our method is decreasing with




ordered by their implied degree of heterogeneity:
 1 = f(1.00,1.50),(0.2,0.3)g,  2 = f(1.00,1.50),(0.2,0.4)g,  3 = f(0.25,0.75),(0.2,0.3)g,  4 = f(0.25,0.75),(0.2,0.4)g,
 5 =f(0.25,1.25),(0.2,0.3)g,  6 =f(0.25,1.25),(0.2,0.4)g,  7 =f(0.25,2.00),(0.2,0.3)g,  8 =f(0.25,2.00),(0.2,0.4)g.
17 All reported running times refer to an implementation on a Dual Core 2 GHz processor machine.
27TABLE 2: APPROXIMATION ERRORS FOR DIFFERENT  
  Number of iterations Approx. error e k Max. distance k CPU computing
(H =50) (last iteration) (last iteration) time
 1 35 0.005 10 4 1 min 10 s (0.18)
 2 35 0.005 10 4 0 min 56 s (1.14)
 3 79 0.001 10 5 2 min 14 s (0.39)
 4 74 0.004 10 4 2 min 23 s (0.42)
 5 58 0.005 10 4 6 min 14 s (0.29)
 6 55 0.011 10 3 1 min 44 s (0.26)
 7 41 0.011 10 3 1 min 10 s (0.18)
 8 37 0.021 10 3 1 min 15 s (0.22)
Note: Figures in parentheses denote running time of the decomposition algorithm expressed as a fraction of the
running time as required by our benchmark simultaneous solution method.
TABLE 3: CONVERGENCE BEHAVIOR IN THE PRESENCE OF STRONG INCOME EFFECTS
 ,  Number of iterations Approx. error e k Max. distance k CPU computing
(H =50) (last iteration) (last iteration) time
0.50, 0.80 33 0.015 10 3 1 min 06 s (0.17)
0.25, 0.80 30 0.035 10 3 1 min 05 s (0.18)
0.80, 0.50 42 0.014 0.013 1 min 27 s (0.19)
0.80, 0.25 53 0.042 0.037 1 min 33 s (0.25)
0.50, 0.50 42 0.117 0.011 1 min 15 s (0.23)
0.25, 0.25 47 0.171 0.015 1 min 42 s (0.25)
Note: Figures in parentheses denote running time of the decomposition algorithm expressed as a fraction of the
running time as required by our benchmark simultaneous solution method.
the degree of heterogeneity. Overall, the quality of approximation is still very good: computed
prices fall within a reasonably small interval around the true equilibrium price path (k is around
10 5  10 3).
Motivated by the discussion of the potential convergence failure of the SR algorithm in the
presence of signiﬁcant income effects (Section 3), we conduct a number of sensitivity analyses
for behavioral parameters governing intra-period and intertemporal substitution/income effects
(seeTable3). Lookingﬁrstattheintra-perioddimension, weﬁndthatcombinationsoftoosmall
and  can pose serious problems for our decomposition approach. Although the search process is
28terminated within a modest number of iterations, both approximation measures indicate a rather
poor quality of approximation for   0.5. If  is small, the quantity of labor supplied is relatively
insensitive to price changes which also means that income changes are more easily tolerated.
As for the role of intertemporal income effects, we do not experience problems of convergence
or a poor quality of approximation (results not shown). However, the speed of convergence (in
terms of the number of iterations required for convergence) is the slower, the larger is h. This
ﬁnding indicates that income effects stemming from an intertemporal reallocation of resources
do not cause problems of convergence.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper develops a decomposition approach which can be applied to solve high-dimensional
static and dynamic general equilibrium models with many households. We demonstrate its ef-
fectiveness for computing equilibria in high-dimensional OLG models which are infeasible for
conventional simultaneous/direct methods. We ﬁnd that the proposed algorithm provides an efﬁ-
cient and robust way to approximate general equilibrium in models with a large number of hetero-
geneous agents if income effects remain sufﬁciently weak. The appropriateness of our solution
method therefore depends on the characteristics of the underlying model and the nature of the
implemented policy shock.
We believe that our approach can be beneﬁcial for a wide range of economic applications.
In particular, it is advantageous for modeling tasks which necessitate to economize on the di-
mensionality of the corresponding numerical problem. Potential applications may include multi-
country and multi-sectoral OLG models, and analyses of relevant policy issues —such as, e.g.,
population aging, trade policy, and poverty— which require detailed account of the distributional
effects on a household level while at the same time taking into account general equilibrium ef-
fects. Moreover, our decomposition approach may prove useful for the further development of
fully-integrated static and dynamic microsimulation models that incorporate the essential micro-
macro linkages required for a comprehensive policy analysis.
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31Appendix A (not for publication)
In order to facilitate the description of the algorithm and to clarify the algebraic forms used in the
associated computer programs, this appendix reviews some fundamental aspects of calibration
which underly most CGE models.
CES preferences
Calibration refers to the process of selecting values of model parameters which ensure that the
model’s reference equilibrium is consistent with given data. Such data are typically obtained in
the form of a social accounting matrix for a given base year. CGE models are based on paramet-
ric forms which describe technology and preferences. The most common functional form used
in empirical applications is the constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) function. A CES utility










where C denotes the vector of consumption goods Ci, i = 1,...,n. There are n +1 parameters in
this function, with n share parameters i >0 and a curvature parameter . The latter is related to
the Allen-Uzawa elasticity of substitution  as:  =1 1= with  <1 and  >0.
Consumers in CGE models are typically modeled as budget constrained utility-maximizers, so




i=1pi Ci =M (A-2)
where pi is the price of consumption good i, and M is consumer income. We can solve the con-









where p denotes the price vector, and i 6= i0. The calibration of preferences involves inverting this
demand function to express the function parameters in terms of an observed set of prices and
demands. If a consumer chooses to consume quantities Ci when commodity prices are pi, we




32where >0 is an arbitrary scale factor18, and the elasticity parameter, , is exogenously speciﬁed.
We tend to think of the share and scale parameters as calibrated values, determined by an agent’s
observed choices in a reference equilibrium, whereas the elasticity parameters are “free parame-
ters” which are typically drawn from econometric estimates of the responsiveness of demand or
supply to changes in relative prices. In traditional applied general equilibrium models, the refer-
ence quantities Ci and prices pi are based on a benchmark equilibrium data set.
The calibrated share form
Inapplied workit maybe convenientto workwitha differentyet equivalentform ofthe CESutility
function[Rutherford,1995a]. Thecalibratedshareformisbasedontheobservedquantities,prices
and budget shares. In computational applications the calibrated form is preferable because it pro-
vides a simple parameter and functional check that is independent from second-order curvature.



















































i pi Ci .
Wecanthinkofthedemandfunctiongivenhereasasecond-orderTaylorapproximationtothe
“true”demandfunctionbasedonanobservationofthetruefunctionatthereferencepoint. Atthat
18 The consumer maximization problem is invariant with respect to positive scaling ofU, hence the share parameters
may only be determined up to a scale factor.
33point, Ci corresponds to a “zeroth order approximation” to the utility function, pi corresponds to
the “ﬁrst order approximation”, and the “free parameter”  controls the second (and higher) order
properties of preferences. The benchmark prices correspond to the marginal rate of substitution
—the slope of the indifference curve— at C. As long as one remains in the neighborhood of p, the
elasticity parameter  only plays a minor role, and calibrated demand is determined largely by C
and p.
Appendix B (not for publication)
$title Appendix B: a prototype Auerbach-Kotlikoff OLG model
$ontext
The benchmark social accounting matrix:
| Output | Income categories | Consumption categories
| OUT | CAP LAB TAX | CON INV GOV
-------------------------------------------------------------------
OUT | 5,306 1,786 1,474
CAP | 3,521
LAB | 5,041
TAX | 779 1,491




Note: Based on 1996 IO tables for USA. Numbers in 1996 USD billion.
Depending on the number of households within each generation
it is necessary to scale the benchmark data.
$offtext
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Introduce intertemporal sets
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The model captures all generations alive in the first model period
* (year 0) and all those born in the span of the subsequent 150
* years, where generations are labeled according to the year in which
* they are born. The model is solved in 5-year intervals with each
* new generation being born at the start of a period and living to
* the age of 55.
SCALAR timint Single period time interval /5/,
iniyear Year in with oldest generation was born /-50/;




t(g) Time periods in the model /
0,5,10,15,20,25,30,35,40,45,50,55,60,65,70,75,80,85,90,95,
100,105,110,115,120,125,130,135,140,145,150/,
a(t) Typical life-cycle / 0,5,10,15,20,25,30,35,40,45,50/,
alabels(t) Labels for plots /0,10,20,30,40,50/,
glabels(g) Labels for plots /"-40","-20",0,20,40,60,80,100,120,140/,
tlabels(g) Labels for plots /0,20,40,60,80,100,120,140/,
h Household types within one generation /1*1/;
* We need some special sets to identify key time periods and
* generations:
SET tfirst(t) First period in the model,
tlast(t) Last period in the model,
atgen(g,h) Generations with terminal assets;
34* These special sets are identified by their order in the declaration:
tfirst(a) = yes$(ord(a) eq 1);
tlast(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq card(t));
atgen(g,h) = yes$((card(g)-card(a)+1) lt ord(g));
* Aliases used to manipulate sets:
ALIAS (g,gg,yr), (t,tt), (a,aa), (h,hh);
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Introduce fundamental parameters
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARAMETER rbar_a Annual interest rate /0.05/,
gamma_a Annual population growth rate /0.01/,
delta_a Annual depreciation rate /0.07/,
sigma Intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
sigma_cl Elasticity of substitution (C vs L),
phi Consumption share parameter /0.8/,
scale Factor for scaling benchmark data /1/;
sigma(h) = uniform(1.2,1.2);
sigma_cl(h) = 0.8;
* Avoid the tedium of coding both Cobb-Douglas and CES
* demand functions:
sigma(h)$(abs(sigma(h)-1) < 0.01) = 0.99;
sigma_cl(h)$(abs(sigma_cl(h)-1) < 0.01) = 0.99;
* Modify annual rates of change to 5-year interval between solution
* periods:
PARAMETER rbar Periodic interest rate,
gamma Population growth rate,
delta Periodic depreciation rate
rho_cl Exponent in intratemporal utility;
rbar = (1+rbar_a)**timint - 1;
gamma = (1+gamma_a)**timint - 1;
delta = 1 - (1-delta_a)**timint;




PARAMETER year(g) Point in time,
age(a) Age at a given point in the life cycle,
pref(g) Reference price path (present value index),
qref(g) Reference quantity path (index),
pi(a,h) Productivity index,
pshr(a,h) Population by age group and household type,
number(h) Relative number of households by type;
year(g) = iniyear + timint * (ord(g)-1);
age(a) = timint * (ord(a)-1);
* Declare indices for present value prices and for population size:
pref(g) = 1 /(1+rbar_a)**year(g);
qref(g) = (1+gamma_a)**year(g);
* Assume equal relative population size for each household type:
number(h) = 1/card(h);
* Age group A share in total polutation:
pshr(a,h) = number(h)*(1/qref(a)) / sum(aa, (1/qref(aa)));
* Productivity index as in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987):
35pi(a,h) = exp(4.47 + uniform(0.02,0.04)*age(a) - 0.00067*(age(a))**2) / exp(4.47);
* Use ages and years to set up correspondence between generations,
* age, and year:
SET mapg(g,a,yr) Assignment from generation and age to time period;
mapg(g,a,yr) = yes$(year(g)+age(a) eq year(yr));
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Read benchmark data
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARAMETER c0 Benchmark private consumption
i0 Benchmark investment
g0 Benchmark government consumption
r0 Benchmark capital earnings (net of tax)
l0 Benchmark labor earnings (net of tax)
s0 Benchmark savings
t0 Benchmark transfers to households
y0 Benchmark output
tr0 Benchmark tax rate on capital income
tl0 Benchmark tax rate on labor income;
* Scale benchmark data according to the number of household types









tr0 = 0.779*scale * 1/r0;
tl0 = 1.491*scale * 1/l0;
* Infer capital stock from earnings and the steady-state return:
SCALAR k0 Initial capital stock;
k0 = r0 / (rbar+delta);
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Modify benchmark data to represent a consistent steady-state
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Modify investment level and revise consumption accordingly to keep
* total demand constant:
c0 = c0 + i0 - (gamma+delta) * k0;
i0 = (gamma+delta) * k0;
s0 = r0 + l0 + t0 - c0;
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Calibration model: Solve for benchmark steady state of reference
* generation
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Find utility discount rate, RHO, and time endowment, OMEGA, to set
* implied aggregate values at the benchmark level. Government
* transfers to households, T0, are modeled as exogenous lump-sum
* payments and are added to household incomes according to each
* generation’s share in the total population. We use the equations
* arising from the household utility maximization problem to set up
* a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) and use the solver to find
* the value of RHO that satisfies all the equations in the system.
VARIABLE
CA(a,h) Present value of assets over the life cycle,
CMA(a,h) Value of assets held by age,
36CCMA(h) Aggregate value of assets held by age,
RHO Period utility discount rate,







CPZ(a,h) Price of full consumption (present value),
ETA(a,h) Price of time (present value utils),
LAMDA(h) Price of income (present value utils);
EQUATION
eqz(a,h) Definition of consumption,
eqcpz(a,h) Definition of price of full consumption,
eqc(a,h) FOC for consumption,
eqs(a,h) FOC for leisure time,
eql(a,h) FOC for labor time,
eqeta(a,h) FOC for price of time,
eqlamda(h) FOC for price of income,
eqca(a,h) Present value assets over the life cycle,
eqcma(a,h) Value of assets held by age,
eqccc(h) Aggregate consumption,
eqccma(h) Aggregate value of assets,
eqccclev Fix level of aggregate consumption,
eqccmalev Fix level of aggregate assets;
* Equation definitions:
eqz(a,h).. CZ(a,h) =e= ( phi*CC(a,h)**rho_cl(h) +
(1-phi)*CELL(a,h)**rho_cl(h) )**(1/rho_cl(h));
* First order conditions:
eqc(a,h).. LAMDA(h)*pref(a) =e= (1+rho)**(1-ord(a))
* CZ(a,h)**(1-rho_cl(h)-1/sigma(h))
* phi*CC(a,h)**(rho_cl(h)-1);
eqs(a,h).. ETA(a,h) =e= (1+rho)**(1-ord(a))
* CZ(a,h)**(1-rho_cl(h)-1/sigma(h))
* (1-phi)*CELL(a,h)**(rho_cl(h)-1);
eql(a,h).. ETA(a,h) =g= LAMDA(h)*pref(a)*pi(a,h);
eqlamda(h).. sum(a,pref(a)*CC(a,h))
=e= sum(a,pref(a)*(pi(a,h)*CL(a,h) + pshr(a,h)*qref(a)*t0));
eqeta(a,h).. OMEGA =e= CELL(a,h) + CL(a,h);
* Price indices:




eqca(a,h).. CA(a,h) =e= sum(aa$(ord(aa) lt ord(a)),
pref(aa)*(pi(aa,h)*CL(aa,h)+pshr(aa,h)*qref(aa)*t0-CC(aa,h)));
eqcma(a,h).. CMA(a,h) =e= CA(a,h)/(qref(a)*pref(a));
* Aggregate values:
eqccc(h).. CCC(h) =e= sum(a,CC(a,h)/qref(a));
eqccma(h).. CCMA(h) =e= sum(a,CMA(a,h));
* Fix aggregate level of consumption and assets at benchmark level:
eqccclev.. sum(h, CCC(h)) =e= c0;
eqccmalev.. sum(h, CCMA(h)) =e= (1+rbar)*k0;
37*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Associate variables with equations
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MODEL bench
/eqz.CZ, eqcpz.CPZ, eqca.CA, eqcma.CMA, eqc.CC, eqs.CELL, eql.CL,
eqeta.ETA, eqlamda.LAMDA, eqccc.CCC, eqccma.CCMA, eqccclev.RHO,
eqccmalev.OMEGA/;
















* Solve calibration model:
bench.iterlim=1000;
bench.workspace=200;
SOLVE bench using mcp;
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Use endowments and the calibrated consumption and leisure time profiles




piref(g,h,t) Baseline productivity profile,
eref(g,h,t) Baseline endowment profile,
cref(g,h,t) Baseline consumption profile,
ellref(g,h,t) Baseline leisure time profile,
lref(g,h,t) Baseline labor time profile,
zref(g,h,t) Baseline full consumption profile,
tref(g,h,t) Baseline transfers to households,
pellref(g,h,t) Baseline reservation wage,
pzref(g,h,t) Baseline price of full consumption,
zref_t(g,h,a) Baseline post-terminal consumption profile,
pref_t(a) Baseline post-terminal price path,
pzref_t(g,h,a) Baseline post-terminal full consumption,
mref(g,h) Baseline present value of consumption;
* We assign demand and income profiles for generation G at time T
* based on endowments and the calibrated consumption profile for
* generation 0. The trick here is to use a GAMS loop over the mapping
* which relates generations (G), ages (A) and time periods (T):
LOOP(mapg(g,a,t),
piref(g,h,t) = pi(a,h);
eref(g,h,t) = qref(g) * OMEGA.l;
cref(g,h,t) = qref(g) * CC.l(a,h);
ellref(g,h,t) = qref(g) * CELL.l(a,h);
lref(g,h,t) = qref(g) * CL.l(a,h);
zref(g,h,t) = qref(g) * CZ.l(a,h);
pellref(g,h,t) = pref(g) * ETA.l(a,h)/LAMDA.L(h);
tref(g,h,t) = qref(g) * pshr(a,h)*t0*qref(a);
pzref(g,h,t) = pref(g) * CPZ.l(a,h); );
* The last model generation is born in year 150 which means that in
* order to capture the full life cycle of all model generations we
38* need to cover a 50-year "post-terminal" period. We index these
* post-terminal periods by the same index (A) that we use to index
* ages in a life cycle. Consumption profiles in post-terminal periods
* for generation G at age A are inferred from the consumption levels
* in the initial period of generations that have the same age.
LOOP((g,a,tlast)$(year(g)+age(a) gt year(tlast)),
zref_t(g,h,aa)$(age(aa)+year(tlast) eq age(a)+year(g))
= qref(g) * CZ.l(a,h); );
* Present value prices in post-terminal periods are extrapolated from
* the value of the reference price index in the terminal period:




* Present value of consumption by generation, including post-terminal
* consumption by generations who live beyond the model horizon:
mref(g,h) = sum(t, zref(g,h,t)*pzref(g,h,t))
+ sum(a, pzref_t(g,h,a)*zref_t(g,h,a));
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Distribute assets holdings by type
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARAMETER a0ref(g,h) Baseline initial asset holdings,
atref(g,h) Baseline terminal asset holdings;
* Initial assets (use mapping to identify generation at time zero
* from age of reference generation):
a0ref(g,h) = sum(mapg(g,a,"0"), CMA.l(a,h));
* Assets left at end of terminal period for generation G are inferred
* from inital assets:
LOOP((g,gg), atref(g,h)$(ord(g) eq (ord(gg) + (card(g) + 1 - card(a))))
= a0ref(gg,h) * (1+gamma)**card(t) / (1+rbar); );
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Parameters for counterfactual experiments
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARAMETER
taxr Model tax rate on capital earnings,
taxl Model tax rate on labor earnings;




* Define share parameters
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PARAMETER alphac Goods share of full consumption;
alphac(g,h,t)$zref(g,h,t) = cref(g,h,t)*pref(t) / (zref(g,h,t)*pzref(g,h,t));
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Model in GAMS/MCP. This model solves for the equilibrium transition path
* subject to terminal conditions that assume the presence of a steady
* state. If there are no exogenous changes the model replicates the
* calibrated consumption profiles. We use this feature to check the
* calibrations and then solve for the results of a fundamental tax reform.
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
POSITIVE VARIABLE
39* Activity levels. These determine how inputs are converted into
* outputs according to the technology implied by functional forms and
* the benchmark data. The variables here are activity levels and an







* Prices. The variables here are the prices that are associated with
* each commodity. An equilibrium requires that prices are such that
* supply equals demand:
PY(t) Price of output
PL(t) Wage rate (price of labor in efficiency units)
PR(t) Rental rate
PK(t) Price of capital
PU(g,h) Price of intertemporal utility
PKT Price of post-terminal capital
PELL(g,h,t) Reservation wage
PZ(g,h,t) Price of full consumption (current value)
PZT(g,h,a) Price of full consumption (current value)
* Incomes. These are agents that receive income from endowments or
* taxes and spend it to maximize utility. The variables here are
* income levels and an equilibrium requires that total income equals
* total expenditure:
RA(g,h) Representative agents by generation
GOV(t) Government with period-by-period budget
* Auxiliary variables. These are endogenous variables associated with
* model constraints that relate the transition to the steady state.
* The replacement tax is varying over time to ensure government
* budget balance period by period:
KT Terminal capital




* Equations asscociated with model variables. These fall into three
* classes. PRF which ensure zero profit in each activity, MKT which
* ensure no excess demand for each commodity, and DEF which ensure







mkt_py(t) Price of output
mkt_pl(t) Wage rate (price of labor in efficiency units)
mkt_pr(t) Rental rate
mkt_pk(t) Price of capital
mkt_pu(g,h) Price of intertemporal utility
mkt_pkt Price of post-terminal capital
mkt_pell(g,h,t) Reservation wage
mkt_pz(g,h,t) Price of full consumption (current value)
mkt_pzt(g,h,a) Price of full consumption (current value)
def_ra(g,h) Representative agents by generation
def_gov(t) Government with period-by-period budget
* Equations associated with auxilliary variables used to impose
* steady-state restrictions on the values of terminal period
* variables:
eq_kt Terminal capital










prf_k(t).. PK(t)*k0 =e= PR(t)*r0 + (PK(t+1) + PKT$tlast(t))*k0*(1-delta);
prf_i(t).. PY(T) =e= PK(t+1) + PKT$tlast(t);
prf_l(g,h,t)$cref(g,h,t).. PELL(g,h,t) =g= PL(t) * piref(g,h,t);
prf_z(g,h,t)$zref(g,h,t)..







=e= mref(g,h) * PU(g,h)**(1-sigma(h));
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The following define market clearance by ensuring no excess demand
* for each commodity
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mkt_py(t)..
Y(t) * y0 =e= I(t) * i0




sum(g, sum(h, L(g,h,t) * piref(g,h,t)))
=e= l0 * Y(t) * ((PY(t)*(1+tl0)) / (PL(t)*(1+taxl)));
mkt_pr(t).. K(t)*r0 =e= r0 * Y(t) * ((PY(t)*(1+tr0)) / (PR(T)*(1+taxr)));
mkt_pk(t).. K(t-1)*k0*(1-delta) + I(t-1)*i0
+ sum(g, sum(h, a0ref(g,h)/(1+rbar)))$tfirst(t) =e= K(t)*k0;
mkt_pu(g,h).. U(g,h)*PU(g,h)*mref(g,h) =e= RA(g,h);
mkt_pkt.. sum(tlast, K(tlast)*k0*(1-delta) + I(tlast)*i0)
=e= sum(atgen, atref(atgen) * KT);




Z(g,h,t) =e= U(g,h) * (PU(g,h)*pzref(g,h,t)/PZ(g,h,t))**(sigma(h));
mkt_pzt(g,h,a)$zref_t(g,h,a)..
ZT(g,h,a) =e= U(g,h) * (PU(g,h)*pzref_t(g,h,a)/PZT(g,h,a))**(sigma(h));
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------




sum(t, PELL(g,h,t) * eref(g,h,t))
+ sum(t, PY(t) * tref(g,h,t))
+ sum(tfirst, PK(tfirst) * a0ref(g,h)/(1+rbar))
41+ sum(tlast, AT(g,h) * PK(tlast) * (-atref(g,h)))
+ KT * PKT * (-atref(g,h))
+ sum(a, ZT(g,h,a) * PZT(g,h,a) * zref_t(g,h,a));
def_gov(t).. GOV(t) =e= PY(t) * qref(t) * (-t0)
+ taxl * PL(t) * l0 * Y(t) * ((PY(t)*(1+tl0)) / (PL(t)*(1+taxl)))
+ taxr * PR(t) * r0 * Y(t) * ((PY(t)*(1+tr0)) / (PR(t)*(1+taxr)))
+ sum(g, sum(h, cref(g,h,t)* Z(g,h,t)
* (PZ(g,h,t)*pref(t)/(PY(t)*(1+TAU(t))*pzref(g,h,t)))**sigma_cl(h)
* PY(t) * TAU(t)));
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The following equations describe additional constraints used to
* close the model and select the level of endogenous taxes
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Terminal capital stock is "targetted" to provide a smooth rate
* of investment growth in the final period:
eq_kt.. sum(tlast(t), I(t)/I(t-1)) =e= 1 + gamma;
* Select the levels of post-terminal consumption of goods and
* leisure so that the present value price declines with the
* endogenous steady-state interest rate:
eq_zt(g,h,a)$zref_t(g,h,a)..
sum(tlast, PZ(g-(ord(a)-1),h,tlast))
=e= PZT(g,h,a) * (sum(tlast(t), PY(t-1)/PY(t)))**(ord(a)-1);
* Select terminal capital stocks so that all generations living
* past the terminal period achieve the same equivalent variation:
eq_at(g,h)$atgen(g,h).. U(g,h) - U(g-1,h) =e= 0;
* Set the endogenous tax to balance the government budget to
* balance period by period:
eq_tau(t).. PY(t) * qref(t) * g0 =e= GOV(t);
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------


































* Solve the same model using the SEQUENTIAL RECALIBRATION algorithm.
* First, define various parameters to define the "related" Ramsey optimal
* growth problem and to later carry out recalibration of preferences.
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Install baseline profiles for post-terminal periods:
PARAMETER eref_t(g,h,a) Baseline post-terminal endowment profile,
tref_t(g,h,a) Baseline post-terminal transfers to households,
piref_t(g,h,a) Baseline post-terminal productivity profile;
LOOP((g,a,tlast)$(year(g)+age(a) gt year(tlast)),
eref_t(g,h,aa)$(age(aa)+year(tlast) eq age(a)+year(g)) = eref(g,h,tlast);
tref_t(g,h,aa)$(age(aa)+year(tlast) eq age(a)+year(g)) = tref(g,h,tlast);
piref_t(g,h,aa)$(age(aa)+year(tlast) eq age(a)+year(g)) = pi(a,h); );
* Declare fundamental parameters needed to compute in each iteration
* of the algorithm the optimal household behavior (partial equilibrium
* relaxation) and to recalibrate preferences of the representative
* agent (RA):
PARAMETER
cra(t) Reference consumption path for RA
lra(t) Reference labor supply path for RA (in efficiency units)
ellra(t) Reference leisure path for RA
era(t) Time endowment for RA (in efficiency units)
pcra(t) Price index associated with reference consumption path
plra(t) Price index associated with reference labor supply path
theta(g,h,t) Benchmark budget share by generation
theta_t(g,h,a) Benchmark budget shares for post-terminal periods
putill(g,h) Price for intertemporal utility
putill_tg(g,h) Price for intertemporal utility (terminal generations)
pzzt(g,h,a) Price of post-terminal full consumption
uindex(g,h) Utility index by generation (relative to benchmark)
py_t(a) Post-terminal present value prices
pl_t(a) Post-terminal present value prices
pzz(g,h,t) Price index for full consumption
income(g,h) Lifetime income
zz(g,h,t) Full consumption




* Initialize representative agent model such that it endogenously
* reproduces the benchmark steady state equilibrium of the underlying
* OLG economy:
cra(t) = sum(h, sum(g, cref(g,h,t)));
lra(t) = sum(h, sum(g, piref(g,h,t)*lref(g,h,t)));
ellra(t) = sum(h, sum(g, ellref(g,h,t)));
era(t) = lra(t) + ellra(t);
pcra(t) = pref(t);
plra(t) = pref(t);
* Compute the benchmark value budget shares. For periods up to the
* terminal period:
theta(g,h,t) = (pzref(g,h,t) * zref(g,h,t) / sum(tt, pzref(g,h,tt)*
zref(g,h,tt)))$(not atgen(g,h)) + ((pzref(g,h,t) * zref(g,h,t)
+ sum(a$(ord(t) eq card(t)+age(a)), pzref_t(g,h,a)
* zref_t(g,h,a))) / (sum(tt, pzref(g,h,tt)*zref(g,h,tt))
+ sum(aa, pzref_t(g,h,aa)*zref_t(g,h,aa))))$atgen(g,h);
* For post-terminal periods:
theta_t(g,h,a)$atgen(g,h) = pzref_t(g,h,a) * zref_t(g,h,a)
/ (sum(t, pzref(g,h,t)*zref(g,h,t))
+ sum(aa, pzref_t(g,h,aa) * zref_t(g,h,aa)));
43*---------------------------------------------------------------------------






LL(t) Labor supply (in efficiency units of labor),
UTIL Utility,
ZZZ(t) Full consumption
PY(t) Price of Y,
PL(t) Wage rate,
PR(t) Rental rate,
PK(t) Price of capital,
PUTIL Price of intertemporal utility,
PKT Price of post-terminal capital,
PELLL(t) Reservation wage,
PZZZ(t) Price of full consumption,
RAM Representative agent (Ramsey agent),
IRSS(t) Tax collector,







prof_ll(t) Labor supply (in efficiency units of labor),
prof_util Utility,
prof_zzz(t) Full consumption,
mrkt_py(t) Price of Y,
mrkt_pl(t) Wage rate,
mrkt_pr(t) Rental rate,
mrkt_pk(t) Price of capital,
mrkt_putil Price of intertemporal utility,
mrkt_pkt Price of post-terminal capital,
mrkt_pelll(t) Reservation wage,
mrkt_pzzz(t) Full consumption,
def_ram Representative agent (Ramsey agent),










prof_k(t).. PK(t)*k0 =e= PR(t)*r0 + (PK(t+1) + PKT$tlast(t))*k0*(1-delta);
prof_i(t).. PY(T) =e= PK(t+1) + PKT$tlast(t);
prof_ll(t).. PELLL(t) =g= PL(t);
prof_zzz(t).. (PY(t)*(1+TAU(t))/pcra(t))**(pcra(t)*cra(t)/(pcra(t)*cra(t)
+ plra(t)*ellra(t))) * (PELLL(t)/plra(t))**(plra(t)*ellra(t)
/(pcra(t)*cra(t) + plra(t)*ellra(t))) =e= PZZZ(t);
prof_util.. prod(t, (PZZZ(t))**((pcra(t)*cra(t) + plra(t)*ellra(t))
/ sum(tt, (pcra(tt)*cra(tt) + plra(tt)*ellra(tt))))) =e= PUTIL;
44*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The following define market clearance by ensuring no excess demand
* for each commodity
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mrkt_py(t).. Y(t) * y0 =e= I(t) * i0
+ cra(t) * ZZZ(t) * (PZZZ(t)*pcra(t)/(PY(t)*(1+TAU(t))))
+ GOVV(t)/PY(t);
mrkt_pl(t).. LL(t) =e= l0 * Y(t) * ((PY(t)*(1+tl0)) / (PL(t)*(1+taxl)));
mrkt_pr(t).. K(t)*r0 =e= r0 * Y(t) * ((PY(t)*(1+tr0)) / (PR(T)*(1+taxr)));
mrkt_pk(t).. K(t-1)*k0*(1-delta) + I(t-1)*i0
+ sum(g, sum(h, a0ref(g,h)/(1+rbar)))$tfirst(t) =e= K(t)*k0;
mrkt_putil.. UTIL * PUTIL * (sum(t, pcra(t)*cra(t) + plra(t)*ellra(t))) =e= RAM;
mrkt_pkt.. sum(tlast, K(tlast)*k0*(1-delta) + I(tlast)*i0)
=e= sum(atgen, atref(atgen) * KT);
mrkt_pelll(t).. era(t) =e= LL(t) + ellra(t) * ZZZ(t) * (PZZZ(t)*plra(t)/PELLL(t));
mrkt_pzzz(t).. ZZZ(t) * PZZZ(t) =e= UTIL * PUTIL;
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------




sum(t, PELLL(t) * era(t))
+ sum(t, PY(t) * (sum(h, sum(g, tref(g,h,t)))))
+ sum(tfirst, PK(tfirst) * (sum(h, sum(g, a0ref(g,h)/(1+rbar)))))
+ KT * PKT * (sum(h, sum(g, -atref(g,h))));
def_govv(t).. GOVV(t) =e= PY(t) * qref(t) * (-t0)
+ taxl * PL(t) * l0 * Y(t) * ((PY(t)*(1+tl0)) / (PL(t)*(1+taxl)))
+ taxr * PR(t) * r0 * Y(t) * ((PY(t)*(1+tr0)) / (PR(t)*(1+taxr)))
+ cra(t) * ZZZ(t) * (PZZZ(t)*pcra(t)/(PY(t)*(1+TAU(t))))*PY(t)*TAU(t);
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The following equations describe additional constraints used to close
* the model and select the level of endogenous taxes
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
equ_kt.. sum(tlast(t), I(t)/I(t-1)) =e= 1 + gamma;
equ_tau(t).. PY(t) * qref(t) * g0 =e= GOVV(t);
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Assign initial values and bounds for activity levels, prices,




















GOVV.l(t) = PY.l(t) * qref(t) * g0;












SOLVE olg using mcp;
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Check initialization of the "related" Rasmey optimal growth problem
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ramodel.iterlim=0;
SOLVE ramodel using mcp;
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Run a counterfactual: a fundamental tax reform
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Reduce tax on capital income by an amount corresponding to $150
* billion in the benchmark (consumption tax adjusts endogenously
* to keep government budget balanced):
taxr = tr0 - scale*150*1E-3/r0;
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------








PARAMETER olg_p Equilibrium prices from OLG model,
itrlog_i Iteration log for investment,
itrlog_ir Iteration log for interest rate,
itrlog_uindex Iteration log for utility index,




itrlog_ir(t,"OLG")$(not ord(t) eq card(t)) = pr.l(t)/pr.l(t+1);
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Solve the underlying OLG model via SEQUENTIAL RECALIBRATION, i.e., solve
* for the effects of a fundamental tax reform by computing equilibria for
* a sequence of "related" Ramsey optimal growth problems
*---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Declare iterations and define labels for plot:
SET iter Iterations in the SR algorithm /iter1*iter100/
ilabels(iter) Labels for plot /iter1,iter5,iter10,iter15,
iter20,iter25,iter30,iter35/;
PARAMETER dconv Convergence metric /1/;
LOOP(iter$(dconv > 1e-6),
46* Solve within each iteration the representative agent model:
ramodel.iterlim=50000;
SOLVE ramodel using mcp;
* Update post-terminal prices using a steady-state projection of
* respective terminal period’s prices:
py_t(a)$(ord(a) gt 1) = sum(tlast, PY.l(tlast))
/ (sum(tlast(t), PY.l(t-1)/PY.l(t)))**(ord(a)-1);
pl_t(a)$(ord(a) gt 1) = sum(tlast, PL.l(tlast))
/ (sum(tlast(t), PY.l(t-1)/PY.l(t)))**(ord(a)-1);
* Update price index for composite consumption good:
pzz(g,h,t) = pzref(g,h,t)*(alphac(g,h,t) * ((PY.l(t)*(1+TAU.l(t)))/pref(t))**(1-sigma_cl(h))
+ (1-alphac(g,h,t)) * (PL.l(t) * piref(g,h,t)/pellref(g,h,t))
**(1-sigma_cl(h)))**(1/(1-sigma_cl(h)));
* Update price index for post-terminal consumption of goods:
pzzt(g,h,a)$(ord(a) gt 1) = sum(tlast, pzz(g-(ord(a)-1),h,tlast))
/ (sum(tlast(t), PY.l(t-1)/PY.l(t)))**(ord(a)-1);
* Update full consumption price index:
putill(g,h) = (sum(t$zref(g,h,t), theta(g,h,t) * (pzz(g,h,t)
/(pzref(g,h,t)))**(1-sigma(h)))**(1/(1-sigma(h))))$(not atgen(g,h))
+ ((sum(t$zref(g,h,t), theta(g,h,t) * (pzz(g,h,t)
/(pzref(g,h,t)))**(1-sigma(h))) + sum(a$(ord(a) gt 1 and
zref_t(g,h,a)), theta_t(g,h,a) * (pzzt(g,h,a)/pzref_t(g,h,a))
**(1-sigma(h))))**(1/(1-sigma(h))))$atgen(g,h) ;
* Update lifetime income:
income(g,h) = sum(t, PL.l(t) * piref(g,h,t) * eref(g,h,t)
+ PY.l(t) * tref(g,h,t))
+ sum(tfirst, PK.l(tfirst) * a0ref(g,h)/(1+rbar))
+ sum(a, pl_t(a) * piref_t(g,h,a) * eref_t(g,h,a)
+ py_t(a) * tref_t(g,h,a));
* Update utility index:
uindex(g,h) = income(g,h) / (putill(g,h) * mref(g,h));
* Update full consumption and post-terminal full consumption:
zz(g,h,t) = (uindex(g,h) * (putill(g,h)*pzref(g,h,t)
/ pzz(g,h,t))**sigma(h))$zref(g,h,t);
zzt(g,h,a)$zref_t(g,h,a) = uindex(g,h) * (putill(g,h)*pzref_t(g,h,a)
/ pzzt(g,h,a))**sigma(h);
* Update material consumption:
cons(g,h,t)$zref(g,h,t) = cref(g,h,t) * zz(g,h,t) * (pref(t)*pzz(g,h,t)
/ (PY.l(t)*(1+TAU.l(t))*pzref(g,h,t)))**sigma_cl(h);
* Update leisure consumption:
celll(g,h,t)$zref(g,h,t) = ellref(g,h,t) * zz(g,h,t) * (pzz(g,h,t)
* pellref(g,h,t)/(PL.l(t) * piref(g,h,t)
* pzref(g,h,t)))**sigma_cl(h);
* Update labor supply:
labsup(g,h,t) = eref(g,h,t) - celll(g,h,t);
* Record solution for each iteration:
itrlog_uindex(iter,g,h) = uindex(g,h);
itrlog_i(t,iter) = I.l(t)/qref(t);
47itrlog_ir(t,iter)$(not ord(t) eq card(t)) = PR.l(t)/PR.l(t+1);
dconv = sum(t, abs(PY.l(t)*(1+TAU.l(t)) - pcra(t)));
itrlog_e(iter) = sum(t, abs(PY.l(t)*(1+TAU.l(t)) - olg_p(t)));
itrcount = ord(iter);
* Recalibrate preferences of the representative agent and adjust time
* endowment refelcting labor productivity of households from the under-
* lying OLG model:
cra(t) = sum(h, sum(g, cons(g,h,t)));
lra(t) = sum(h, sum(g, piref(g,h,t) * labsup(g,h,t)));
ellra(t) = sum(h, sum(g, celll(g,h,t)));








* Exit if GNUPLOT is not installed:
$if not exist ’%gams.sysdir%\wgnupl32.exe’ $exit
PARAMETER fig1 Welfare change by year of birth,
fig1_li Welfare change by year of birth (last iteration),
fig2 Impact on investment
fig2_li Impact on investment (last iteration)
fig3 Interest rate
fig3_li Interest rate (last iteration)
fig4 Approximation error;
fig1(g,"h=1, OLG") = 100 * (U.l(g,"1") - 1);
fig1(g,iter)$(ord(iter) le itrcount) = 100 * (itrlog_uindex(iter,g,"1") - 1);
fig1_li(g,"h=1, OLG") = 100 * (U.l(g,"1") - 1);
fig1_li(g,"SR, last iteration") = 100 * (uindex(g,"1") - 1);
fig2(t,"OLG") = 100 * (itrlog_i(t,"OLG") - 1);
fig2(t,iter)$(ord(iter) le itrcount) = 100 * (itrlog_i(t,iter) - 1);
fig2_li(t,"OLG") = 100 * (itrlog_i(t,"OLG") - 1);
fig2_li(t,"SR, last iteration") = 100 * (I.l(t)/qref(t) - 1);
fig3(t,"OLG")$(not ord(t) eq card(t)) = itrlog_ir(t,"OLG") - 1;
fig3(t,iter)$(not ord(t) eq card(t) and ord(iter) le itrcount) = itrlog_ir(t,iter) - 1;
fig3_li(t,"OLG")$(not ord(t) eq card(t)) = itrlog_ir(t,"OLG") - 1;
fig3_li(t,"SR, last iteration")$(not ord(t) eq card(t)) = PR.l(t)/PR.l(t+1)-1;
fig4(iter) = itrlog_e(iter);
$setglobal labels glabels
$setglobal gp_opt1 "set xlabel ’Generation’"




$setglobal gp_opt1 "set xlabel ’Year’"
$setglobal gp_opt2 "set ylabel ’Change from baseline (in %)’"
$libinclude plot fig2
$libinclude plot fig2_li




$setglobal gp_opt1 "set xlabel ’Iteration’"
$setglobal gp_opt2 "set ylabel ’1-norm of price differences between
computed and true equilibrium’"
$libinclude plot fig4
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